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I. INTRODUCTION 
Broad groups of the population (from trade unionists to conservative 
philosophers) seem to share the opinion that the growing integration 
of financial markets endangers the harmonious development of soci- 
ety. They often link the growing importance of  international finan- 
cial streams to the process of European integration. Such negative 
feelings build on a long popular tradition. In the literature, in the mov- 
ies and the theatre, financiers and bankers very often are depicted in 
far from sympathetic terms. There are plenty of  examples, ranging 
from Shakespeare's Sliylock to Dickens, ai~d  from the bankers in "Mary 
Poppins" to Dagobert Duck. Where do these negative feelings come 
frorn?' 
Most economists are keenly aware of  the importance of  financial 
markets for the smooth working of the economy. As they have diffi- 
culties to understand the popular worries, they tend to dismiss them 
as naive and old-fashioned. Undoubtedly, economists are partly right. 
Yet I wil1 try to argue that a simple dismissal is somewhat too easy. A 
better understanding of the origin of these negative feelings rnay make 
us aware of  some really important economic (or ethical) problems. 
Reducing the worries about financial markets to technica1 problems 
is insufficient. My argumentation remains very gcneral and non-tech- 
nical. Not al1 the detailed points are tightly argued and I did not aim 
"eiltcr  for Economic Studies and Center for Economics and Ethics, K.U.Lewen. Leuven. 
45 1 at a complete list of references. The only ainbition of this paper is to 
set up a genera1 frame of reference2. 
The paper is structured around the different elements in its title. 
In fact, each of these elements may be a source of confusion. Many 
laymen simply distrust the working of al1 markets and some wil1 even 
fee1 that markets are unethical by definition. Many economists on the 
contrary have an almost mythical vision of markets as the solution to 
al1 social problems. In order to make clear my  own frame of  refer- 
ence I present in section II some general ideas about "markets". This 
wil1 also allow me to introduce what I consider to be important ethi- 
cal concerns. I then move on towards my topic. In section 111 I discuss 
the specificity of financial (as compared to other) markets and in sec- 
tion IV I introduce the idea of European integration. Bn  section V I 
draw some general conclusions about the relationship between eco- 
nomics and ethics. 
11.  MARKETS 
Before we can turn to our topic of financial markets, it is important 
first to solve some misunderstandings about markets in general. To 
some extent economists are responsible for these misunderstandings, 
because for many of them markets are "efficient" almost by  defini- 
tion. Partly as a reaction to this one-sided view, others (often non- 
economists and definitely at the othe:  side of the ideological spec- 
trum) see markets as embodying everything that is objectionable in 
capitalist societies. For them, markets stimulate egoism and leave no 
room for income redistribution. In my view, a discussion on the eth- 
ics of markets based on either of these two extreme positions really 
leads to nothing. To argue this, I want to start from an extreme and 
provocative example. 
In an impressive book the Italian author Primo Levi (1958), who 
was one of  the survivors of  the concentration camp of Auschwitz- 
Birltenau, describes the daily life in the camp. In one of the chapters 
he gives a detailed account of the development in the camp of a (black) 
market for al1 kinds of  necessities: spoons and forks, clothes, shoe- 
laces. In principle, the prisoners had to hand over al1 their posses- 
sions when they arrived in the camp, but some could in one way or 
another smuggle some necessities with them. Despite the strict pro- 
hibition by the camp authorities, a lively system of exchanges devel- 
oped. Equilibrium prices were formed and Primo Levi describes how these equilibria changed through outside influences. When workers 
from the town came in the camp, they sometimes were able to "im- 
port" some commodities and this supply effect had predictable con- 
sequences: an increase in the supply of  spoons lowered immediately 
tbe equilibrium price for spoons on Auschwitz' black market. 
I have deliberately chosen this provocative example, very far re- 
moved from my  main topic, because it illustrates some basic charac- 
teristics of markets in a completely different context from the one we 
are used to. Let me mention four of them. 
A.  The ethica1 evaluation of a social system Izas to he an evalution of 
the genera1 (integrated) setting 
The example of the black market in the Auschwitz-camp is revolting 
and wil1 induce a sharp feeling of  mora1 indignation in most of  US. 
Reading Levi's description makes US creep al1 over. But do we have 
this feeling because of the existence of the market as such? Probably 
not: at least my own indignation is not about the existence of the mar- 
ket, but about its setting within a concentration camp. This yields im- 
mediately a first important insight. To evaluate markets, one has to 
consider the genera1 setting in which the market transactions take 
place. There is no reason why markets automatically would lead to 
socially desirable outcomes. Even if  the concentration camp market 
would have been perfectly cornpetitive (of course it was not) the gen- 
era1 situation is far from perfect. It is no less than madness. 
B. Markets are efficient (in a certain sense) 
This being said, the market in the concentration camp was necessary 
to survive. Prisoners who needed better clothes to avoid freezing had 
to go through the exchange mechanism. Each of  the exchanges was 
"welfare-improving"  in the traditional sense: if  prisoner A had two 
spoons, but no shoelaces and prisoner B had shoelaces but needed a 
spoon, it was better for both of  them to exchange spoons and shoe- 
laces. This basically reflects the genera1 economic idea about the al- 
locative efficiency of  the market mechanism, which holds true even 
in the insane situation of the camp. Allocative efficiency is a relevant 
feature for judging a situation: within the terrible situation of  Aus- 
chwitz, the existence of the black market probably improved the sit- 
uation of most prisoners. This leads immediately to a secoiid ethical insight (and I am aware 
that the use of  the word "ethical" in this setting is provocative- this is 
exactly the reason why I have chosen this example). Once markets are 
in place, discrimination of individuals cannot be acceptable. Since ex- 
changes were necessary to survive, excluding some individuals from 
the black camp market would have been extremely unjust. In general, 
we could cal1 this an aspect of "procedural" justice. Markets must be 
open to al1 interested participants. Not only must they be open to al1 
participants: to be fair there has to be a sufficient spread of informa- 
tion. If  a hungry newcoiner in the camp "buys" a loaf of bread at an 
extremely disadvantageous price, because he does not know (and can- 
not know) the real "market price" we do not feel tliis to be just, even 
if  he has agreed voluntarily to the transaction. 
C. Markets do not guarantee distributive justice 
Procedural justice is only one aspect of justice, however. From a broad- 
er point of view the cainp illustrates another feature of markets: the 
fact that they do not necessarily lead to a just distribution. Take the 
case of a prisoner who did not succeed in smuggling anything inside 
the camp and who is too sick to "earn" something by performing ser- 
vices. This prisoner will have nothing to exchange: he will not be able 
to get anything from the market. The black market in the camp will 
not help him to survive. Again, this illustrates a genera1 idea. Mar- 
kets may be efficient from an allocation point of view, but there is no 
mechanism at work to  produce a "just" distribution (however defined). 
D. Markets are unavoidable 
The most remarkable fact about the Auschwitz-market is the sheer 
and simple fact that it existed, despite the prohibition by the camp au- 
thorities. Even within an SS-camp and under SS-rules, market trans- 
actions took place. This points to a crucial characteristic of these trans- 
actions: two or more individuals come together and feel (they can be 
wrong) that they al1 gain through the exchange of  some good(s) (in- 
cluding money). Therefore, the motivation to exchange will be very 
strong among these individuals. Moreover, they themselves are the 
only persons having information about their preferences. As a regu- 
lating government does not dispose of this extremely relevant infor- 
rnation, it will face enormous difficulties when it tries to monitor these 
transactions. History and actual reality indeed show that it is almost impossible 
to prohibit or ban markets. Control of market transactions can never 
be complete: think about drugs (alcohol prohibition and the maffia), 
weapons, illegal immigration - even kidneys. In al1 these cases the ex- 
istence of markets may be ethically deplorable - but apparently it is 
impossible to control it. In this sense one could say that markets are 
unavoidable. In a fine paper on incentive compatability and asymmet- 
ric information, Peter Hammond (1987) talks about "markets as con- 
straints".  We  may perhaps not always like market forces, but at the 
same time it would be extremely naive and dangerous to neglect them. 
The concentration camp analogy strongly suggests that it is impor- 
tant to go further than a superficial debate about "markets" versus 
"government intervention or regulation". The simgle statement that 
markets necessarily are "efficient" implicitly assumes a narrow defi- 
nition of  efficiency. It may be true that markets under some condi- 
tions may be efficient (and are unavoidable) to solve allocation prob- 
lems, as in the Auschwitz-example. Uet from a broader perspective, 
allocative efficiency is only one among many desirable things and on 
its own ir is certainly insufficient to guarantee a good society. In this 
sense, "market efficiency" always has to be complemented with other 
objectives. In my view the example illustrates unambiguously that the 
social acceptability of market outcomes is conditioned by (a) the broad- 
er social environment in wliich the market transactions take place and 
(b) the answer given to the distribution problem. 
The distribution problem immediately raises the question of  how 
to define "justice". I do not want to go into the endless debate on that 
question, but it seems useful to sketch its piace in the overal policy 
discussion. At an abstract level, 1[  think that it makes sense to distin- 
guish two kinds of  transactions in the economic sphere. First, there 
are transactions which lead to an increase in the welfare of al1 partic- 
ipant~.  We talk about exchanges and about markets. But secondly, 
there are also decisions which are necessarily divisive. Decisions on 
the allocation of property rights are of this kind- and property rights 
have to be defined first for market transactions to make sense. When 
a given amount of money is to be distributed over a given number of 
individuals, more money for one individual implies less money for an- 
other. This is a situation of  inherent conflict of  different self-inter- 
ests. Violence is one option to "solve" such a conflict. Another option 
is for the opponents to discuss the matter in terms of rights and jus- 
tice. I propose to interpret "justice" as the "word" used to structure this kind of  discussions, as the concept around which the social de- 
bate can turn. 
The real-life importance of that discussion cannot be overestimated. 
If people agree about ethica1 standards, these can be applied in acute 
conflict situations. In a certain sense, the conflict disappears, as soon 
as al1 participants agree about the way to solve it. One could say that 
they then agree about a social project, i.e. about the way distribution 
problems should be solved in a good society. As the alternative for 
the acceptance of  such a social project is an open conflict, possibly 
leading to violence, the link between justice and social cohesion is 
clear. In myview, an open discussion about justice is necessary to avoid 
the fragmentation of society. Of course, this does not at al1 mean that 
there ever wil1 be complete consensus about the concrete content of 
distributive justice. However, policy-makers should in any case be 
aware of the susceptibilities of their citizens. 
While the concentration camp-analogy points our attention to the 
limitations of  markets, it als0 conviiicingly illustrates their positive 
points. Mlocative efficiency is extremely important.  Moreover, policy 
interventions should be carefully considered. As said before, even the 
camp authorities did not have complete control over the market system 
in the camp. In the real world of  asymmetric information, policy 
measures can have undesirable  consequences. When working out 
concrete policy measures, one has to take into account the reactions 
of the economic agents. A strongly redistributive tax policy is not nec- 
essarily the best policy for the poor. Naive  policy-making can be 
extremely dangerous. 
III. FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Let US now against this genera1  background look at financial markets. 
Apparently, there is something special about these markets. It is strik- 
ing how our most important philosophical and religious traditions al1 
contain an important anti-interest and anti-money bias. The prohibi- 
tion of  interest (or usury) is very strong in Aristotle. Jewish thinking 
forbids interest payments within the community of Jews and Islamic 
thinking has the tradition of  the prohibition of  the "ribâ".  Both in 
Jewish and Islamic communities this tradition still plays an important 
role. In Western Europe, scholastic catholic thinking (Thomas Aquinas) 
was als0 opposed to usury and interest. Even an economically oriented 
thinker like the Flemish Jesuite Lessius (around 1600 and facing the rapid growth of financial markets in the Low Countries and in North- 
ern Italy) took in this respect a moderate position and constrained the 
pursuit of interest in many ways (Bouckaert (1994), contains a collec- 
tion of readings on these various traditions. See also Baeck (1994)). 
Of course, a modern economy could not work without interest and 
I certainly do not want to go back to these old traditions: we now rea- 
lise al1 too wel1 the econornic advantages of  a market economy. But 
nevertheless these old traditions contain some valuable ideas, which 
may be inspiring for our present-day attitude towards financial mar- 
kets. Moreover they offer a useful starting point to better understand 
popular negative feelings towards financial markets. I[  will build up 
my reasoning in three steps, closely related to the general framework 
presented in the previous section. First, there are problems of  effi- 
ciency and what I have called procedural justice. Second, there is the 
problem of distributive justice. Third, I would like to raise a funda- 
mental question concerning the origin of needs and preferences and 
the direction of econornic growth. 
A. Ejjiciency, procedural justice and the internal working offinancial 
markets 
Economists emphasize that financial markets have their own speci- 
ficity (see Tirole (1994), Weremans (1997)). Their role is the buying 
and selling of  risk. They are characterised by  asymrnetric informa- 
tion: one party has superior in~ormarion  regarding the risk. A smal1 
saver or deposit holder cannot without considerable cost obtain in- 
formation about the quality of  any particular bank. A lcnder cannot 
without considerable cost obtain information about the quality of dif- 
ferent investment projects. Moreover, the value of financial products 
will be highly dependent on the public's perception of and its confi- 
dence in the stability not only of the specific financial institution, but 
also of the financial system as a whole. These consideratioas lead to a 
need for regulation on pure efficiency grounds. Albeit to different de- 
grees, we indeed observe such regulation everywhere in the capitalist 
world. 
1. Systemic risk 
A first argument for government interveiltiori relates to what is called 
"systemic risk". If  one financial institution gets int0 deep financial 
trouble, this may have a kind of  domino-effect, threatening the sta- bility of the whole financial system. This domino-effect is a straight- 
forward example of an externality and the case for government inter- 
vention in the case of externalities is well-known. Note that one should 
think carefully about the best instruments for such government inter- 
vention: the previous argument does not at al1 imply that the govern- 
ment has to regulate al1 aspects of the everyday working of the finan- 
cial system. 
2.  The protection of  the small depositor 
These is a second and more basic problem, however. In al1 firms in a 
capitalist economy the capita1 owners more os less control or moni- 
tor the managers. Typical for the financial sector in general and the 
banking sector in particular is that (a) banks finance most of their in- 
vestment externally; (b) their solvency is crucial for the worliing of the 
payment system; (c) their debt is much more than in the industrial sec- 
tor held by many small depositors. 
Considerations (a) and (b) suggest that the need for monitoring is 
especially acute in the case of the banking sector. Consideration (c) 
suggests that monitoring by the many small holders of  the debt wil1 
be extremely difficult. Many small debt-holders will not have the means 
or the expertise to monitor the banlis. Moreover, the result of moni- 
toring the minagers is a public good for al1 the small depositors and 
an individual depositor will not be motivated to spend time and ef- 
fort if he can easily benefit from the efforts of others. This is the tra- 
ditional free-rider-argument. It is therefore normal to see the gov- 
ernment entering the market as a monitoring or regulating agent on 
behalf of the small depositors. Economists will speak about "pruden- 
tial regulation". 
To a large extent this can be analysed as a pure efficiency problem. 
However, these aspects are also closely related to the notioii of pro- 
cedural justice introduced in the previous section. Is there a balance 
of power between the different participants in the marltet? Is infor- 
mation evenly spread over the population? One can also approach the 
question of  prudential regulation from a different angle- emphasiz- 
ing the need to protect the weaker groiips in society. Unsopliisticated 
economic agents may fee1 i11  at ease in their contacts with sophisti- 
cated bankers and may have difficulties to understand complicated 
contracts. Banks (and insurance companies) clearly see this problem 
and attach much importante to personalised services. But this does not change the weak and dependent position of  iineducated agents 
and their risk of being "exploited". Contrary to what economists some- 
times seem to think, this situation is not necessarily improved by more 
competition: more competition and more choice make the decision 
problem still more complicated. The protection of the weaker groups 
in society has always been one of the basic intuitions in the tradition- 
al debate on usury and interest. It probably is als~  important to ex- 
plain the vague negative feelings concerning financial markets in our 
actual societies. To many economists however this concern has a hint 
of paternalism. 
B. Distributive j~lstice  and financial  markets 
The probiems of systemic risk, of protecring tlie smaii ciepvsiîors and 
of  guaranteeing equal conditions to al1 participants involve (iinpor- 
tant) aspects of procedural justice specific to financial markets. How- 
ever, as I emphasized in the previous section, we also have to consid- 
er the question of distributive justice. Of course,  when thinking about 
justice it does not make sense to concentrate only on financial mar- 
kets. Justice relates to the broad structure of society, to the environ- 
ment in which financial transactions take place. In this sense, al1 the 
societal aspects are closely interconnected. However, to structure my 
discussion, I focus as much as possible on aspects of  capita1 income, 
credit allocation and investment. To get a better feeling about crucial 
justice  aspects in this context, I wil1 derive my  inspiration froin em- 
pirical survey studies and from our intellectual tradition oii the pro- 
hibition of usury and interest3. 
1. Capita1 income and the "desert"  criterion 
A basic idea in that tradition is the simple conviction that "money 
should not earn money". This Same simple idea reappears over and 
over again in the empirica1 findings of social scientists on the justice 
opinions of ordinary people. It is part of what Elster (1992) has called 
the "commonsense conception of justice". A just income distribution 
gives (almost by definition) to al1 people what they are entitled to - 
and this entitlement is based to a large extent on "desert" or "merit" 
(apart from need). For most respondents, desert and merit are de- 
fined in one way or another in terms of effort (Arts and Van der Veen 
(1992), Tornblom (1992), Miller (1992), Schokkaert (1998)). This genera1 idea has immediate consequences for the evaluation 
of financial markets. Money accrues to capita1 owners simply because 
they own capita1 and very often they do not even have acquired this 
capita1 through work: being very wealthy is often a consequence of 
having had wealthy parents (or having been extremely lucky). This 
probably is the reason why many respondents (which means: citizens) 
fee1 that "capita1 income" is "undeserved income". This may be a vague 
feeling rather than a reasoned judgment and, even without consider- 
ing efficiency arguments, it would be extremely naive to draw imme- 
diately the conclusion that government should ban al1 capita1 income. 
Efficiency arguments can only increase this need to be cautious. How- 
ever, there surely is a crucial problem of justice perception by many 
citizens. 
Let US compare this justice perception with the real world situa- 
tion and thereby concentrate on the most relevant policy instrument: 
taxation. In most countries, the tax on capita1 income has become 
much lower than the tax on labour income. This is exactly the oppo- 
site of what most people consider to be just. The problem gets worse 
because citizens observe that, while it is very difficult to evade the tax 
on labour income, capita1 owners have many opportunities to evade 
or avoid their part of income taxes. The relevancy of  this finding is 
obvious in a situation where the deep dissatisfaction of many citizens 
with the tax system presents a real challenge to politicians. This dis- 
satisfaction can be partly explained by the simple fact that a majority 
of people considers the tax rates on labour income to be too high. But 
the growing discrepancy between the taxes on labour and on capita1 
income is an important additional factor, which should be taken int0 
account when one wants to restructure the fiscal system. 
2.  Concern for the poor 
A crucial element in the Jewish, Islamic and scholastic tradition on 
usury is the concern for the poor. Those who are in financial difficul- 
ties and have to borrow money are in an extremely weak position. And 
the poorer they are, the more badly they need a loan and the stronger 
the power position of the lender. The possibly resulting exploitation 
of the poor is ethically unacceptable. Both the Jewish and the Islamic 
tradition are very explicit about the commandment to help the poor 
(albeit in the first place in the own community). This basic intuition 
has kept al1 its relevancy to understand the justice opinions of the cit- izens: in genera1 they are very much in favour of introducing a mini- 
mum floor, below which no one should fall, and are sensitive to the 
problem of social deprivation (Elster (1992), Schokkaert (1998)). 
This concern for the weakest groups in society is closely related to 
the procedural aspects discussed earlier. Poos people cannot easily 
borrow money, because they are bad risks. This implies that they of- 
ten will be liquidity-constrained. On the other hand, many consum- 
ers become victim of the tendency to give consumer credit very (too) 
easily. A large degree of indebtedness may create huge problems, e.g., 
when one loses his os her job and gets unemployed. Government reg- 
ulation seems to be necessary to make it possible for the poor to bor- 
row on more interesting terms and to avoid overindebtedness of the 
consumers. 
But it goes further than these procedural aspects. Social security, 
especially when targeted on the poor, is one of  the most popular in- 
stitutions in Western societies, albeit less popular among economists 
than among other citizens. The perception that the growing integra- 
tion of financial markets threatens the level of social protection might 
therefore immediately have negative repercussions on the image of 
these markets. I will return to this point in the following section. 
Closely related to this are the investment decisions of firms. Finan- 
cial markets play an important role in directing investments towards 
certain activities os sectors (including the choice between real invest- 
ment and financial speculation) and towards regions. Both from the 
point of view of long term-unemployment and structural regional pov- 
erty, these are crucial decisions. In general, it is far from obvious that 
free financial markets always will lead to the solutions which are to 
be preferred from a social point of view. Moreover, even when (dis)- 
investment decisions may be acceptable in a long-ruil perspective of 
growing marltet integration and specialisation, this is not perceived 
as such bq7  the victims who lose their job. %he Renault-case is a very 
typical example. Financial markets and private investments are there- 
fore seeii very often as contributing to the growing job insecurity in 
our societies. Here again, there is a real ethica1 challenge: how to rec- 
oncile long-term econornic productivity considerations with short- 
term social transition problems? C. Needs and prefer-erzces: tlze f~lndamental  debate about welfarisrn 
and democr-acy 
The traditional literature oii interest and ususy confroiits us with a still 
more basic question. A closer look at Aristotle's approach to interest 
and capita1 suggests that he is in the first place concerned about what 
might be a good society (Vandevelde (1994)). He draws a distinction 
behveenï pl-oduciiori to saiisfy the "real needs" of the comrnuriity (the 
polis) and production "for money", where the only aim is to become 
as rich as possible without any concern for creating a good society. 
He rejects the secoiid kind of activities. 
The difficult questions raised by such a rejection are still very rel- 
evant now. Clearly, production for money wil1 only be possible if  one 
prod.aces comirioûities  for which ether economie  are -wiiiing 
to pay, i.e., wliich satisfy consumer preferences. Bul this is exactly al- 
locative efficiency in the traditional econoinic sense. Where do we get 
if we start questioning these preferences theinselves? (As we should 
probably do in a broader, Aristotelian, approach to justice?) Then 
clearly the direction of investment and production in our modern cap- 
italist economies can be questioned. But if  we question preferences 
of the citizens thernselves, who is going to decide what are their "real 
needs"? I suppose nobody of us would be happy in a situation where 
an Aristotelian dictator decides what is good for each of US. We touch 
here the most difficult probleins related to  juslice and markets in gen- 
eral and to justice  and financial markets in particular. After having 
raised the question, I wil1 iiow further neglect it: H have no clear aii- 
swcr and e?aborating  this point would lead to aiiotl~er  a~ïJ  n-iuch long- 
er paper. 
IV EUROPEAN FENANCKAL MARKETS 
Let me suinmarize the general conclusions of  the previous sections. 
Financial inarkets have to be regulated for reassas of  syslemic risk 
and because of  the need to protect the sinall depositors. Moreover, 
fl-om the point of  view of  distribiutive jzistice, private decisions eon- 
cerning loans and investment have to be integrated into a social con- 
text with special attention for the pooi- and the ~anemployed.  Many 
people have questions csncerning the "just"  (in the sence of  "de- 
served")  character of capital income. Let rne nsw take tlze fiilal step 
in tliis paper and diccuss the process of Europeari integration. While European integration may have played a role in the integra- 
tion of financial markets, this role should nol be overrated. The mainly 
integration of  the wliolesale financial markets has been caused by  a 
decrease in tra~isaction  costs, i.e., by the development of  communi- 
cation systems and information networks. European policy has been 
more important for the retail sector, where indeed an iiitensive effort 
has been made to remove national barriers to competition. 
In many respects the opening of the markets has been positive from 
the point of view of  market efficieiicy, because a larger market wil1 
lead to more intensive competition and may create opportunities to 
realise returns to scale. 111 any case, the integration of financial mar- 
kets is by now largely irreversible. Tliis again is a good example of the 
general idea that marltets may act as constraints. Even if  we would 
take the (debatable) starting point that it would have been ethically 
preferable to prevent thc process of integration of financial markets, 
this simply is impossible in a situation with rapidly decliiiing transac- 
tion costs. No governinent could monitor sufficiently al1 the relevant 
capital flows. Naive policy proposals to impleinent capita1 controls are 
therefore impracticable and perhaps even dangerous. This does not 
mean that there is no need or no room for economic policy. Indeed, 
the other insights of tlie Auschwitz-exainpie also remain valid in this 
context. 
In the past, national financial  narl li ets have al1 been regulated to a 
larger or smaller extent according to the importante attaclied to tlie 
different considerations raised in the previous sections. In recent years, 
these different national regulatioas have corne under grswing pres- 
sure. There is now a lively debate among economists concerning the 
optimal degree of prudential regulation, the instrun~ents  to be used 
and tbc best approacli for thc international coordination of  regula- 
tory policies  (see Van  Cayseele and Heremans (19911, Heremans 
(1997)). 
This is ani  imporrant topic. Bril from a11  ethica1 point of  view, at  is 
the easy part. Indeed, as mentioned before, thic rcgulation can large- 
ly be de-lended on efficiency grotlnds alone and does not require con- 
sensus aboui the content of distriburive Qustice. To  come extent it is 
even in the self-interest of the financial sector anid we indeed observe 
that tliis sector tries to regulate itself. The relationships of comple- mentarity and substitutability between this "soft regulation"  (based 
on the desire to build up a good reputation) and government inter- 
vention is an interesting research topic. But soft regulation will not 
help in the face of problems of distributive justice where societies face 
severe conflicts of interest. I do think that most of the vague negative 
feelings and of the more serious ethica1 concerns about financial mar- 
kets relate to these distributional matters. 
B. Redistribution under pressure 
International competition does not only put pressure on the internal 
regulation of  financial markets. More importantly, it als0 threatens 
the whole social construction of Western European welfare societies. 
The cor,sequences of  econûmic integration are especially severe for 
the justice of financial markets. 
1. Taxation of capita1 income 
The growing discrepancy between the taxation of labour and of cap- 
ital income can partly (largely?) be explained by the integration of in- 
ternational capita1  maskets. Financial capital is highly mobile and goes 
where the tax rate is lowest. In al1 European countries the taxon cap- 
ital income has been eroded gradually to avoid large capital outflows. 
Here is a real challenge. On the one hand, it is obvious that this sit- 
uation hurts the justice feelings of many citizens. This may have eco- 
nomic consequences as it will have an influence on the bargaining be- 
haviour of  trade unions and on the willingness to pay taxes. On the 
other hand, the possibilities of individual countries to do something 
about this are extremely limited. Increasing strongly the taxation of 
capita1 income would not only be economically insane, the resulting 
decrease in economic activity would als0 have undesirable distribu- 
tional consequences as the weakest groups in society would probably 
be hurt most severely. 
Although there are no easy answers concerning the best policy re- 
action in tliis situation, there is still rnuch truth in the conventional 
wisdom that the most straightfonvasd remedy is the coordination of 
the tax policies of the various countries. Although still difficult (cer- 
tainly as long as Switzerland is not part of  the European union), it 
would be much easier to impose a taxon capital incoine at the Euro- 
pean level. A good case can be made for such a tax both on the ground 
of justice and from the point of view of allocative efficiency. 2.  Social protection in the EU 
An analogous problem of  tax competition arises with respect to the 
level of  social protection. Where different countries compete for at- 
tracting investment (and hence, employment), there may result down- 
ward pressure on social protection. Social security and provisions for 
the poor are threatened. Again, the most immediate conclusion is the 
need for action at the European level. The construction of  a social 
Europe is extremely important from the point of view of  distributive 
justice (see also Atkinson (1995)). In so far as the international com- 
petition has the game-theoretic structure of a prisoner's dilemma, co- 
ordination of national policies may also be efficient, i.e., welfare-im- 
proving for al1 the individual countries. 
Financial and investment decisions are especially important for two 
of the most crucial problems facing European societies today. The first 
is the large number of long-term unemployed. The analysis of unem- 
ployment is a complex problem, but undoubtedly investinent and eco- 
nomie growth play a crucial role in this regard. I only want to men- 
tion here the position taken by econoinists like Drèze and Malinvaud 
(1994) (and translated in a weaker form in the Delors-White Paper) 
that, first, a large investment effort is needed to attack the invest- 
ment problem and that, second, the present European monetaiy pol- 
icy is too restrictive (see als0 De Grauwe (1998)). Clearly, both these 
concerns relate to the working of financial markets. 
The second problem is even more difficult. It seems obvious to me 
that one of the most difficult challenges facing Europe is the growing 
pressure of labour migration from outside the European bastion. One 
cannot indefinitely defend an island of social security amidst an ocean 
of poverty. She only way to counteract these migration tendencies is 
the economie development of the regions around the European com- 
munity: Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, North-Africa. If 
there are profitable investment opportunities, one can expect a redi- 
rection of investment streams towards these regions. In a certain sense, 
market efficiency and considera-tions of basic justice would then co- 
incide. Yet the main victims, either of increased immigration or of in- 
creased investment abroad, will be the lower-skilled in Western Eu- 
rope. And it is not at al1 obvious how the negative effects on their wel- 
fare position will be absorbed. 
My oveiview of  distributional challenges has been basically a su- 
perficial restatement of the conventional wisdom from the fiscal fed- eralism literature that redistribution must be assigned to the highest 
level of government. There is now a recent, but already huge and rap- 
idiy growiilg literature on the consequences of  econoinic integration 
for fiscal policies, in which this conventional wisdom is sometimes se- 
verely challenged. In his introduction for a special issue of "Interna- 
tional Tax and Public Finance" on "Taxation, Redistribution and Eco- 
nomie Integration", Meen (1997) emphasizes that "this conventional 
wisdom is the start of serious analysis, not the end". I do agree. But at 
the sanie time he also notes: "Redistribution is not, it seems, a fash- 
ionable word. The topic itself, however, is liltely to force itself -even 
more strongly, perhaps- upon policy-makers for some while yet." I 
could iiot agree more. 
C. Tlze basic irnbalance 
All this brings us to a very genera1 conclusion. The Auschwitz-exam- 
ple shows that allocative efficiency is not a guarantee against mad- 
ness. Markets can only function within a well-defined structure of 
property rights and wijl only yield ethically acceptable outcomes if  the 
broader social a~id  political environment is sufficiently wel1 devel- 
oped. This is not to say that actual international financial marltets lead 
to insane results. But it may draw our attention to the fundamental 
imbalance between tlie development of these rnarltets on the one hand 
and ehe development of international political and social institutions 
on the other hand. Onr can havewidely divergent opinions about what 
is distributive justice, about the concrete macroeconoinic or environ- 
mental policy to be followed, about the optima1  level of prudential reg- 
ulation, about the need to tax capital income. But at the same time 
tliere can be no doubt that a concrete policy in any of these domains 
can now only be succesfully implemented at the international level. 
For some of these proble~ns,  even tlie Europea~~  level wil1 not be suf- 
ficient. This means tliat we need strong international iiistitutions. The 
real challcnge is îo design such international institutions in a demo- 
cratie way. If  this is not done succesfully, the perception of  the un- 
hampered warking of  financial markets wil1 keep inducing in many 
citizens negative reactions going from a vague feeling of  unease lo 
strong ethica1 indigilation. V. CONCLUSIOW: ETHICS, ECOPJOMICS MD  FINANCIAL 
MARmTS 
Among many non-economists there is a growing concern about the 
ethical implications of tlie integration of financial markets. Most econ- 
omist~  hardly understaild the reasons for this concern. Shis situation 
is tl-ierefore an interesting starting point to derive some genera1 in- 
sights about the relationship between econornics and ethics. 
Much unaiecessary  confusion arises from the mythology of  mar- 
kets. The provocative Auschwitz-example helps in seeing the limita- 
tions of these myths. On  the one hand, markets are necessary for the 
efficient allocation of goods and cominodities. Moreover, self-inter- 
ested behaviour by economic agents wil1 act as a constraint on the pos- 
sibility of any political authority to infîuence economic outcomes. On 
the other hand, markets are not sufficient to reach acceptable ethical 
outcomes. The outcomes wil1 be codeterminecl by the broader social 
and political context within which markets operate. Especially the dis- 
tributional problems have to be considered seriously. An interesting 
discussion therefore is only possible if  non-economists are aware of 
their blind spot for allocative efficiency and for markets as constraints 
and if economists are aware of their blind spot for distributional mat- 
ters and broader philosophical considerations. 
Financial markets are especially interesting as a test-case because 
thcj  always have bcen looked at  with suspicion by our dominant phils- 
sophical and religious traditions. %liis  suspicion has to do with the dan- 
ger of  exploitatisn of  the weaker groups in society, tlie doubts con- 
cerning the justice of capital income and the broader question of the 
reiationship betweeii investment and what constituies a good society. 
%he concerns about markets therefore get a very specific flavour in 
this context. Economists have devoted mucli attention to the nature 
of fina~icial  markets as marliets of risk, characterised by asjmmetric 
information. This is an interesting research project, leading to many 
crucial insiglits. However, such an "internal" approach is insufficient 
lo answer the broader ethica1 questions about the social acceptability 
of marltel outcomes. 
A closer analysis shows tliat the present debate turiis arouiid the 
iinbalance between the rapid integration of financial (and other) mar- 
kets on the one hand aild the slow development of international po- 
litical institutio~is  on the other hand. %n  facl, further European inte- 
gration and at the very least coordination of  economic policies at the European level is absolutely necessary. This raises a challenge which 
is not in the first place economic, but political. Wil1 we be able to reach 
a consensus at tlie European level about basic justice principles? There 
is an urgent need for a politica1 debate at the European level on  what 
distributive justice really means. 
Yet such a debate is really only a first step. The second necessary 
step is the careful ailalysis of the likely consequences of concrete pol- 
icy proposals. I-lere good economics is necessary to get a realistic pre- 
diction of the effects of policy. Ethics is needed for a social evalua- 
tion of these effects. In such concrete exercises economics and ethics 
are complementary. This paper did not offer such a concrete analy- 
sis. In fact, it is a typical example of the kind of papers on ethics and 
economics of which there are already too many: a genera1 and super- 
ficial treatment of a "big"  economic problem. It is therefore good to 
repeat tliat such a genera1 discussion can only be the start of a serious 
analysis, not the end. 
NOTES 
1. Sen (1993) also ~roriders  at the puzzling contrast between the low image of thc practice 
of finance on the one hand and its high social contribution on the other liand. 
2.  i have presented similar ideas at a COST-seminar oii "Principles of J~istice  and the ELI- 
ropean Unioil" (Scliokkaert (1996)). 
3. Financial markcts have, through interest rates and investment, a largc cffect on the in- 
tergenerational disiribution of welfare. Fliture generatioris are iiot present o11 the mar- 
kets now. Their objectives will therefore not count in actual private market iiivestnient 
decisions. This  is especially important for environmental matters: the effects of acid rain 
or global warming will only appear in the near or far future. These aspects of intergen- 
erational justice and sustainable development should bc kcpt in mind when thinking 
about finaileial markets, bui I wil1 rieglect them in this paper. 
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